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Community as Commodity 
 
Abstract 
Despite utopian claims that the internet generally and Social Networking Sites (SNS) 
(including multi-user virtual environments, or MUVE) in particular herald a challenge 
to the dominance of capitalist ideologies in technological societies, there is growing 
evidence that SNS and MUVE are actually part of a hegemonic transnational agenda 
of conservative venture capital which reinforces hierarchies of consumption.  By 
appropriating these various virtual social networks (either as part of the development 
of the infrastructure or ‘after the fact’), these SNS in fact demonstrate the continued 
and thriving hegemony of capitalism in the wired world.  Using the works of Gramsci 
and Gill to provide a critical grounding, this paper will examine some of the flagship 
SNS of Web 2.0 ⎯ particularly Facebook ⎯ and explore how, rather than 
challenging existing top-down hierarchies and structures, these social networks have 
in fact been appropriated by them. 
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Introduction 
Social Networking Sites, or SNS, are one of the most publicly discussed innovations 
of the internet and particularly of “Web 2.0.”  Whilst community-building and social 
networking are certainly not new, the speed, scope and reach facilitated by these sites 
has heralded unprecedented innovation in the ways in which networked individuals 
approach their social networking.  Social Networking Sites continue to grow, yet the 
balance between the technological features of such sites which support social 
networking and those which facilitate online advertising remains precarious and 
frequently makes national and international news. One factor that has received little 
attention in the literature is cultural fit – which emphasizes the need for venture 
capital to be directed toward economically unexploited but pre-existing activities for 
maximum return on investment.   
 
Whilst much has been written about the implications of social networks themselves, 
there has been little research into the nature and activities of those who develop and 
maintain the platforms upon which these networks rest.  In particular, the venture 
capital which often seeds the growth of these sites is often treated as an anonymous 
and unremarkable part of the process.  This paper seeks to interrogate these aspects of 
SNS by using cultural concepts originally developed by Antonio Gramsci ⎯ such as 
issues of hegemony and cultural fit.  Facebook and Google’s OpenSocial will be used 
as specific case examples to exemplify these issues.   
 
The Phenomenon of Massive Virtual Communities 
Since the turn of the millennium ⎯ and especially since the bursting of the dot com 
bubble ⎯ we have seen the World Wide Web grow from a static resource into an 
interactive space that is now commonly referred to as Web 2.0 (boyd 2007).  From the 
once purely text-based communities of the early web, social networking and 
interaction has now developed to include visually-rich environments (at least 180 or 
so at the time of writing) which are quickly developing a strong presence online 
(Plant 2004).   Gaming consoles (Playstation, Xbox, etc) have brought MUVE into 
the global mainstream, and browser-based MUVE (Metaplace, Croquet etc) are due 
for launch in 2008.  Linden Labs, makers of SecondLife, are already staking their 
claim by rushing through a SecondLife-browser beta.  The interactive 2D internet of 
Web 2.0 and the burgeoning 3D internet of MUVE are fast becoming a mainstay of 
many people’s daily lives. 
  
From their introduction, social networking sites (SNS) such as MySpace, Facebook, 
Bebo, Habbo and the many, many others, and MUVE such as World of Warcraft, 
SecondLife, Entropia Universe and so on, have attracted tens of millions of users, 
many of whom have integrated these activities into their daily lives.  These sites allow 
users to connect or reconnect with people both locally and globally, through email, 
instant messaging, sharing in business or social exchanges, video conferencing, and to 
even immerse themselves in virtual worlds that constitute both an escape from the real 
and a place within which to undertake real socialisation (Turkle 1995; Hardy 2002). 
Through SNS and MUVE we are able to (rediscover and) talk to (old) friends from 
school or college, connect to existing or potential business contacts, or make new 
acquaintances regardless of the limits of physical geography. We are able to build 
relationships with people without being so rigidly bound by region, nationality, 
ethnicity, social role, family, or occupation as to the kinds of companionships we can 
forge and call our own.  This allows us to meet people based on shared interests, 
political views, or other social activities, or on common language or shared racial or 
sexuality-based identities.  It is the formation of these communities of interest (cf: 
Anderson 1983/2006; Feenberg & Bakardjieva 2004) which is arguably SNS and 
MUVE biggest strength. 
   
SNS offer a range of different technological features, catering to a wide range of 
interests and practices. While their key technological features are fairly consistent, the 
cultures that emerge around SNS are varied.  Some, like for example Ecademy or 
LinkedIn, are specifically professional; others like MySpace, more centred around 
music and music culture.  Bebo, Habbo, ClubPenguin and others are almost 
exclusively for children or teenagers, and others still, like Facebook, attempt to bring 
many disparate social groups together in one multilayered virtual space.   The great 
majority of MUVE are perhaps better represented by Massively Multiplayer Online 
Role-Playing Games (MMORPG), in which sometimes very large numbers of players 
interact with one another in a virtual world.  Players assume the role of a fictional 
character or constructed identity, and take control over many of that character's 
actions.  Newer MUVE coming on-stream in recent years include SecondLife, not an 
MMORPG but a virtual world.   SecondLife is not a game in the sense that, although 
it has rules and objectives, it is an open virtual space which the users engage with to 
varying degrees as part of the process of interacting there. 
 
Whilst there has been a fair amount of scholarship ⎯ for example in the Computer-
Mediated-Communication (CMC), and Human Computer Interaction (HCI) fields ⎯ 
concerning SNS and MUVE, much of it has focussed on the interactions and 
networking of such sites, and much of the criticism upon the meaning of friendship 
there: for example, does competitive ‘friending’ turn these so-called friends into mere 
cyber-acquaintance?  Such ‘friendliness’ is no substitute for genuine friendship, 
according to Professor Ray Pahl, co-author of Rethinking Friendship, (Spencer & 
Pahl 2006), and only leaves us feeling dissatisfied. In his opinion, Facebook is a form 
of immaturity:  
"It's not a real social network," he says, "it mimics the playground 
insecurities of primary school kids piling up best friends to find their 
social niche. When people grow up and settle down, they realise that 
real friendship isn't about turning on the computer – it requires real 
effort and taking the rough with the smooth." (Independent, 2007) 
 
Scholarship in the IS field has similarly focussed on the ‘friendship’ issue, and on the 
nature of networked communication. The main strands of enquiry have focussed upon 
“the generation of online ties and their integration into the individual’s existing social 
network,” on the one hand, and the “role of new communication technologies as a 
new channels of communication,” on the other (Mesch & Talmud 2007).  Other work 
in the computer science field has included an extraordinary hoovering up of data from 
100,000 social networking site profiles into a semantic map of personal tastes, (Liu et 
al. 2006).  Livingstone and Helsper’s work offers particularly interesting insight into 
how issues of “anonymity, disclosure of intimate information and exchange of 
resources” (2007) affect communication. 
 
Facebook was originally built for Harvard college students, in February 2004, by 
Harvard student Mark Zuckerberg and his pals, and grew during that year to include 
Stanford, Columbia and Yale.  By May 2005 it had grown to support more than 800 
college networks, was expanding into high-school networks, and then went 
international in October.  In May 2006 it ‘grew up,’ adding to its over six million 
users adult networks based around the workplace ⎯ at first college staff, but soon 
businesses, corporations, and institutions.  By the end of 2006 it had twelve million 
users.  The summer of 2007, however, was the pivotal moment for Facebook.  In 
April there were twenty million users; in May they launched Facebook Platform, an 
Application Program Interface, or API allowing external developers to create and 
offer applications within Facebook, and by the time of writing (January 2008) the site 
boasted 59 million users. At the present rate of growth, Facebook will have more than 
200 million active users by January 2009 (it is arguable, of course, whether all are 
‘active users’). Now active users can find not just old school or college friends and 
work colleagues, but members of the community groups they are involved in.  Across 
these many networks and groupings new ‘virtual’ groupings are springing up daily ⎯ 
many simply for fun, to be discarded tomorrow (e.g. People Who Always Have To 
Spell Their Names For Other People); some with business in mind (e.g. the virtual 
twin of real-world trade association, Manchester Digital); political import (e.g. 
Support the Monks' protest in Burma); some with strange challenges, (e.g. If 100,000 
people join this group I will run from Liverpool to Manchester) and some with more 
personal pleasures in mind.  In many respects the networking taking place on 
Facebook is a replication of the networks in real-life – plus additional new contacts 
made on Facebook itself – which seems to be contrary to the many arguments 
regarding the ‘immaturity’ of social networking friendships.    
 
From being a focussed community built around the commonality of studenthood in 
the United States, it has grown into an international community where you can find 
almost all the people you know who might ever join an SNS ⎯ and many for whom 
Facebook is their very first experience of online social networking.   The personal 
profile changes daily with the news feed of the activities of all of one’s linked friends, 
who are forever sending one messages using new applications which users must first 
install ⎯ and send to everyone they know ⎯ before one receives the message. It is a 
virtual place of constant change and perhaps this busy-ness is as much a part of its 
appeal as its ubiquity. 
 
From MySpace to OurSpace: Google and OpenSocial 
 
The continued growth of SNS as it spreads out from specialized groups and 
subcultures to encompass wider social networks has been matched by growing debate 
and discussion (particularly in the media) about the place and function of such SNS 
within wider social practices.  One common theme is the tensions between ‘private’ 
and ‘public’ behaviour on SNS as users try to negotiate the contradictions between the 
intellectually-known openness of these SNS and the intimacy and emotional contact 
they feel as they actively build their own fragment of the wider social networks.  
Another debate running parallel to this public/private tension is social/commercial 
conflicts exemplified by the introduction of Facebook’s ‘Beacon,’ which will be 
discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
 
Such disparities are not new, and have only become more accentuated as these social 
networks have evolved from the grassroots-style Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) of the 
80s and 90s, and other such text forums, to the massive virtual environments of today 
whose populations’ rival cities and now even countries1.  Social networks and virtual 
communities are no longer dominated by amateur enterprises.  SNS and MUVE are a 
big and growing business concern, often requiring the efforts of sometimes hundreds 
of professionals, and generating revenues that are attractive to investors2. 
 
This formalizing and commercialization of SNS and MUVE occurs not only in the 
underlying code and infrastructure, but is also encroaching on the front-end of these 
sites, the spaces where users meet, socialize, set up profiles or avatars, and build what 
they may feel to be organic, natural or unforced networks. 
 
The dataportability project (dataportability.org) is one such formalization that will 
impact multiple, currently discrete SNS.  Data portability involves cross-linking 
identity data ⎯ the profiles which form the core nodes of most SNS ⎯ across 
multiple platforms (i.e.: from Facebook to YouTube to del.ici.ous).  Data portability 
will link large social network with large social network.  Whilst the aggregate number 
of users from this cross-platform interoperability is difficult to estimate given the 
number of both inactive and multiple identities, it is easy to argue that the end result 
will be massive virtual communities of overlapping networks.  The social networking 
patterns will mimic the underlying infrastructure of the internet itself. 
 
One of the more immediate and intriguing outcomes of this push towards formal data 
portability in SNS is the OpenSocial initiative being led by Google3.  It works by 
connecting the ‘containers’ of the various SNS, the codified structures which support 
the social interactions, and allowing information and applications to move freely from 
one container (say, Orkut) to another (MySpace).  Whilst this raises issues of identity 
management and questions as to who controls the information being disclosed by 
users on an individual level, in terms of social networks on a macro level, OpenSocial 
allows for information to be passed on or tracked back ⎯ information which includes 
details and patterns ripe for exploitation by companies and marketers.   
 
Unsurprisingly, this potential is not one of the features of OpenSocial hyped in the 
coverage: the focus instead is on how OpenSocial is the first true multiplatform 
initiative, and how a number of the largest and most influential SNS are taking part4.   
 
                                                 
1 For example, the population of SecondLife is approximately three times that of the 
national population of New Zealand. (source: US Census Bureau, International 
Database: NZ http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country/nzportal.html. And 
SL:Blog http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy_stats.php 
2 For press coverage, cf: 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2007/tc20070924_995913.htm 
3 Google themselves make an interesting case study in the tensions and contradictions 
between being non-commercial with ‘hacker’ ideologies (‘information wants to be 
free’) co-existing with the economic imperatives of Google as a corporate entity. 
4 For the list of current OS partners, see: 
http://code.google.com/apis/opensocial/partners.html 
But not all: Facebook continues to hold out as more and more SNS sign on to develop 
compatibility with OpenSocial.  Whilst the technical chatter regarding the cross-
compatibility of apps and containers is interesting in its own right, what is more 
fascinating in terms of the discussion here is how both these approaches ⎯ 
OpenSocial’s push towards openness of information exchange versus Facebook’s 
extensive and popular but walled-off approach to massive social networks ⎯ 
demonstrate the movement towards the commodification of virtual communities. 
 
Gramsci, Gill, and the Hegemony of the Transnational Historic 
Bloc 
 
Which brings us to the critical core of this paper.  Commodicification, consumerism, 
and the power of rich elites is the field of enquiry of cultural and political theorists 
and philosophers.  One philosopher whose writings have had a profound affect on our 
understanding of power in society is Antonio Gramsci, who “recognised that social 
power is not a simple matter of domination on the one hand and subordination or 
resistance on the other.”  Gramsci thus re-evaluated traditional Marxist 
understandings of modern capitalist societies by arguing that rather than being 
determined by underlying economic necessities, culture and politics formed a web of 
relations with the economy in which there is a continual shift of emphasis and 
influence.  For this process he coined the term hegemony.  “Rather than imposing 
their will,” Gramsci maintained, “‘dominant’ groups (or, more precisely, dominant 
alliances, coalitions or blocs) within democratic societies generally govern with a 
good degree of consent from the people they rule,” ⎯ they achieve hegemony ⎯ “and 
the maintenance of that consent is dependent upon an incessant repositioning of the 
relationship between rulers and ruled.” (Jones 2006:3).  Insidiously, a dominant bloc, 
in order to maintain its dominance, must be able to “reach into the minds and lives of 
its subordinates, exercising its power as what appears to be a free expression of their 
own interests and desires.” (Jones 2006:4).  
 
This aspect of unwitting collusion on the part of the ruled with the strategies and 
tactics of their rulers is perhaps the best known feature of Gramsci’s concept of 
cultural hegemony; that those strategies and tactics must constantly adapt to the 
shifting needs of the ruled is perhaps less appreciated. Dick Hebdige’s work on sub-
cultural groups perhaps expresses this dynamic best. A simple example of this 
approach is that of Punk.  In the late 1970s, the wearing of safety pins in one’s ear and 
of torn fabrics loosely arranged as clothing was a statement of rebellion, of rejection 
of fashion ⎯ similar to Dada earlier in the century (Hebdige 1979).  By the early 
1980s this ‘look,’ however, had become a fashion in itself.  What was revolutionary 
had been absorbed, packaged, and sold back to the revolutionaries.  Lifestyles 
becoming available in the shops, in this way, brings consumerism into sharp relief.  
Everything is allowed, so long as it can be absorbed into the dominant socio-
economic model; i.e. if it contributes to the market.  Thus the pluralistic nature of the 
modern consumerist society.  
 
This dominance of the market economy has been analysed with brilliantly incisive 
clarity by Stephen Gill, Professor of Political Science at York University.  Gill’s work 
on the New World Order created after 1945 ⎯ of which the world after 1991 he 
describes as but the third phase ⎯ outlines the dominance of the market, of 
transnational capital, the G7 (and more recently G8) and the central role of US power 
in supporting and spearheading this dominance.  The world after the Second World 
War, with its Marshall Plan, its NATO, and its emerging EEC, involved what Gill 
terms (using Gramscian language) an international historical bloc built on a pax 
Americana.  (Gill 2003:58)   In the aftermath of this terrible worldwide conflict, the 
American New Deal state became the model for the whole Western world, albeit 
somewhat modified by the changes required by wartime mobilisation and the 
‘military-industrial complex’ this had spawned.   Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s 
⎯ although it went further, at the time, and was later substantially cut back ⎯ 
nonetheless represented a significant shift in political and domestic policy in the U.S., 
with its most lasting changes being an increased government control over the 
economy and money supply; intervention to control prices and agricultural 
production; the beginning of the federal welfare state, and the rise of trade union 
organizations.  The Second World War tightened the relationship between 
government and economy through mandatory ‘mobilisation’ of industrial units and 
workforce for the production of arms.  This mobilisation was not ‘stood down’ in 
1945, as the Second World War became the Cold War, but evolved into what has 
since been termed the military-industrial complex ⎯ the combination of a nation’s 
armed forces, its suppliers of weapons systems, supplies and services, and its civil 
government.  This military-industrial complex, moreover, through European and 
transatlantic treaties, special relationships and political settlements under American 
leadership, soon established an international military-industrial-complex, 
underpinning an American led economic model ⎯ an international historical bloc. 
(Gill 2003:58) 
 
Despite Bush senior’s talk of a New World Order in 1991, Gill argues that the 
hegemony of American capitalism became a supremacy after the first Gulf War, with 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc and its absorption into the Western economy.  This 3rd 
phase New World Order was also a result of the gradual evolution, through the 1970s 
and 80s, of a more integrated global political economy in which organised labour had 
become increasingly marginalised, and capitalist elites with significant investment in 
many different nations had emerged.  Such elites include those in “key positions in 
transnational companies, banks, universities, think tanks, media companies, 
governments and international organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and 
OECD,” linked by the discourse of neo-liberal globalisation. (Gill 2003:169).  Thus 
the 1st and 2nd phase international historical bloc became transformed into an 
“American-centred and –led transnational historical bloc” (Gill 2003:59) at whose 
“apex are elements in the leading states in the G7 and capital linked to advanced 
sectors in international investment, production and finance” (Gill 2003:59) ⎯ 
increasingly American firms ⎯ whose activities “seek to make transnational capital a 
class ‘for itself’” (Gill 2003:169) 
 
Again, it is axiomatic in the analysis Gramsci provides that any “ruling coalition will 
have to take on at least some of the values of those it attempts to lead, thereby 
reshaping its own ideals and imperatives” (Jones 2006:4).  The exercise of power by a 
dominant bloc becomes a continuous and interpenetrative process, in which society 
becomes saturated with the meticulous negotiations between the desires of the 
dominant and the needs of the subjugated.  Power becomes “something that is 
actively lived by the oppressed as a form of common sense” (Jones 2006:4).  Power 
as understood through the concept of hegemony becomes exceedingly difficult to pin 
down, since it is always “in the process of becoming” (Jones 2006:5). 
Transnational Capital and Social Networking 
 
It is our opinion that Social Networking Sites display precisely this constellation of 
behaviours between a dominant bloc of venture capitalists ⎯ who have achieved 
hegemony in the New World Order ⎯ and the tens of millions of us who willingly 
surrender our personal data and the conduct of our friendships and relationships to 
their marketplace.   
 
There is an understanding amongst marketing professionals, for example, that “the 
reason that people are attracted to social networks in the first place is that reliance on 
user-generated content is seen as relatively free of traditional corporate content and 
advertising” (Goad & Mooney 2008).  Moreover “if users perceive that a social 
network is becoming ‘polluted’ they will leave ⎯ and the evidence suggests that this 
can happen extremely quickly” (Goad & Mooney 2008).    Indeed, there have been a 
number of developments during the very recent past that have begun to highlight a 
much more sinister underbelly to the social networking phenomenon described above. 
For example, the most successful SNS at present, Facebook, was guilty in the closing 
months of 2007 of appearing to become ‘polluted’ by advertising and privacy 
invasion, and was forced by overwhelming pressure from its users to back down.  
Called Beacon, the new system introduced by Facebook in the Autumn of 2007 tracks 
web shopping on partner sites outside Facebook and then sells adverting space within 
the social network based on purchases.  This was seen by many as an invasion of 
privacy. A group on the website calling itself "Facebook: Stop Invading My Privacy" 
grew rapidly to more than 50,000 members, and several other organisations including 
political activism site MoveOn.org protested about the new system.  At the end of 
November 2007 Facebook changed Beacon from an opt-out system to opt in.  Mark 
Zuckerberg, the young founder and CEO of Facebook, issued a press release, 
published widely on national news websites, that Facebook users would now be able 
to switch off Beacon completely.   
 
Facebook users thereby felt they had won a victory over the encroachment of the 
marketplace into their social space.  The reality, of course, is that no such victory was 
achieved at all ⎯ only the appearance of one.  As Zuckerberg himself recently stated, 
in answer to a question from a reporter at the launch of ‘Facebook Ads,’ Facebook “is 
an ad-supported business.”5  The Facebook Ads system has three basic components: 
Facebook Pages, Social Ads, and a reporting interface dubbed Insights. Just as users 
do, brands can create profile pages with applications and content, e.g. music sharing, 
discussion boards and widgets specific to the advertiser's product or service. They can 
also define the actions users can take with their pages, for instance declaring oneself a 
fan of the brand or RSVPing for an event.  Facebook users can declare to all their 
Friends on the network that they are Fans of a particular brand, enabling them to visit 
the brand’s own Facebook Page for more information ⎯ and the opportunity to buy. 
                                                 
5 For further details of this press conference, see: Schonfeld, E. (2007). Liveblogging 
Facebook Advertising Announcement (Social Ads + Beacon + Insights).  Available 
online: http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/11/06/liveblogging-facebook-advertising-
announcement/ 
 
This shift in framing of the economic activities of Facebook-as-business within 
Facebook-as-SNS does not, of course, mean that users have ousted such concerns 
from their ‘social’ space.  These concerns have just been repositioned and reorientated 
to better fit the imaginary construct of SNS as a primarily social space and the 
implied balance between front-end social networking and back-end economic 
interests.  From the perspective put forth in the previous section, Beacon is of interest 
precisely because it unbalanced the relationship between users and owners; the 
understated and understudied hegemonic relationship between these two sides of the 
SNS.  In launching Beacon as originally intended ⎯ an opt-out, third-party, ‘behind-
the-scenes’ collector of personal and commercial data ⎯ Facebook assumed that the 
consent of their users to such practices would automatically extend from existing 
subtle displays (such as AdWords) to this more obvious, explicit, even named and 
labelled displays of such authority over the data on which SNS rested.  Data which 
the SNS users thought they, and not their hosts, owned and controlled. 
 
Beacon, particularly in this early formulation, was a clumsy attempt to appropriate 
and repackage the SNS values of the extended social relationship based upon the 
community-of-interest (regardless of how deep or shallow such ties are, as is being 
debated in the IS literature) for economic and commercial purposes.  The backlash 
against Beacon was not only against the exchange of personal data.  It was also in 
reaction to the way Beacon, and by extension, Facebook’s management, shattered the 
‘suspension of disbelief’ that had developed between the front-end users and the 
back-end business.  For users of SNS such as Facebook, such sites must retain and 
foster the appearance of a divorce between the, non-hierarchical, non-commercial 
socializations on site and the businesses and commercial concerns that run the site.  
As was noted earlier, when this separation fails, users desert the “polluted” site. 
 
However, this is all appearance.  SNS are no longer hobby activities, but large 
commercial enterprises.  And for them, the users and communities on these sites are 
resources to be exploited. 
 
Again, Facebook provides an excellent example of these tensions between the social 
aspects of the network (the public face of the SNS) and the venture capitalism that 
goes on behind-the-scenes.  If the question for users is ‘can I make friends through 
Facebook?’ then the question for owners and investors of such sites is, in the words of 
reporter Tom Hodgkinson (2008) in his coverage of this issue, “can you make money 
out of friendship?” 
 
Hodgkinson’s report into the commercial foundations of Facebook is of particular 
interest, not only for its novelty ⎯ few if any of the media reports on this phenomena 
look at this aspect of Facebook-as-business, preferring to focus on the front-end, 
social activities it supports ⎯ but also for what it suggests about Facebook and 
similar SNS when considered from a Gramscian perspective.  In particular, he 
highlights three inter-related aspects of Facebook operations which engage with the 
issues raised earlier in this paper. 
 
Firstly, Facebook utilizes transnational networks like the internet, which are 
architecturally structured to transcend and subvert geography, whilst at the same time 
emphasising locality and the institutional, political or economic context in which the 
user is physically situated.  Facebook’s own ‘About Facebook’ page constructs a 
rhetoric of communities-of-interest within communities-of-place.  From the 
perspective of socialization, this may seem little more than a gimmick or an artefact 
of Facebook’s evolution.  But considered from an economic perspective, 
communities-of-interest within communities-of-place can be called by another name: 
markets.  As Hodgkinson notes: “We are seeing the commodification of human 
relationships, the extraction of capitalistic value from friendships” (2008).  Whether 
investors or advertisers wish to capture all Facebook users in a place (e.g.: Harvard), 
or of a type (e.g.: movie goers), or both (Harvard students who watch movies), this 
information is given freely and willingly by Facebook users.  By adopting and 
repositioning themselves as ‘social facilitators’ rather than, say, market researchers, 
Facebook develops a hegemonic relationship with their users.  It is only when 
Facebook over-assumes on the relationship, as with Beacon, that users become fully 
aware of and withdraw their consent.  But when the illusion of divorce is maintained, 
the ‘unwitting collusion’ that Gramsci spoke of is perpetuated. 
 
This tendency to freely give up information online without consulting privacy policies 
or other information management statements is an interesting phenomena, and one 
that anecdotal evidence suggests recurs across SNS sites, not just on Facebook.  
Again, the rhetoric of Facebook’s public statements jars with the actions of behind-
the-scenes led innovations like Beacon.  On the ‘About Facebook’ page is the 
following statement on privacy: 
At Facebook, we believe that people should have control over how 
they share their information and who can see it. People can only see 
the profiles of confirmed friends and the people in their networks. You 
can use our privacy settings at any time to control who can see what 
on Facebook.  (2008) 
 
This statement implies that privacy begins and ends with social network privacy ⎯ 
the front-end social exchange of information.  On this important issue, this social 
focus continues as users follow link after link, and whereas the privacy statement on 
social exchange (what will be termed here ‘front-end privacy’ for simplicity’s sake) is 
written in fairly plain, non-jargon language, the statement on the data Facebook-as-
business collects (‘back-end privacy’) uses more opaque language, and shifts quickly 
from mentions of automatic information collection (though cookies and IP logging, 
though there is no mention of Beacon and the information it collects) back towards 
the social rhetoric of front-end privacy issues. 
 
Whilst there are important privacy and data security issues here, in terms of issues of 
hegemony, this (unwitting?) surrender of personal information not only fuels the 
collusion between the rulers and ruled which puts the lie to the narratives of SNS as a 
non-hierarchical space.  By using this information to fund its ‘ad-supported business,’ 
Facebook is in a sense appropriating and repackaging social networking innovations, 
ideas, and creativity, and repackaging them for safe consumption within existing 
social hierarchies.  Users may feel they are creating something new, vibrant, theirs, 
not ‘polluted’ by existing structures and institutions.  Punk may have felt the same 
way before they saw their styles and tropes for sale on the high street. 
 
If it can be accepted that these users can be traded, repackaged, and sold as 
commodities, then what of their social ties?  When considered from the perspective of 
the hegemonic dominance of the commercial interests over the social, the social 
networks take on new importance.  For users, their ties allow them to build social 
networks (both intimate and distant, or strong and weak to use Granovetter’s term) ⎯ 
but, as noted above, these groups can also be articulated as a market.  The 
‘commodification of friendship’ can occur between two friends, or two hundred.  
Spencer and Pahl, (Spencer & Pahl 2006) concerned with social dynamics, argued 
against the ‘friendliness’ of online friends, but in economic terms, the strength of the 
tie or the ‘genuine-ness’ of the friend makes no difference.  What is of interest to 
them is the information exchanged between these ties, across these networks (and 
with little concern for privacy policies).  As long as the illusion of distance is 
maintained, the network is not ‘polluted,’ the behind-the-scenes operations of such 
SNS can maintain hegemony, (and may even, it could be argued, head towards some 
notion similar to supremacy).   
 
What will be interesting to observe is whether, with the fall-out from Beacon, privacy 
and network information will be made accessible or protected on an individual basis 
or whether the lower common denominator approach will rule.  That is, will 
information privacy levels be set differently for each individual in an exchange, or 
will an individual who has otherwise ‘opted-out’ have their information made 
accessible through their interactions with another user whose data is being collected?   
When considering the network as a market, the individual as a commodity, it may not 
be outrageous to expect owners and site operators to spread their nets as wide as they 
can.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Utopian rhetoric surrounding Web 2.0 social networking creates an image of a social 
space, mediated by transnational communication tools, that is democratic, anti-
hierarchical, open, and unconcerned with excessive capitalist agendas.  However, as 
this paper has argued, this perspective ignores the hidden aspects of Social 
Networking Sites as corporate entities with obligations to venture capital investors 
and shareholders.   This paper puts forward the position that, rather than separate from 
the capitalist institutions and histories within which the internet is embedded, the 
internet, including SNS, is in fact a continuation of these practices and ideologies.  
Having made the move from hobby activity to corporate entity, SNS have been 
appropriated to become part of a hegemonic transnational capitalist strategy for 
globalised and unregulated market dominance.   
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